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Introduction 
How much has Latin America grown since its colonial independence? Has her 
gap with advanced countries widened steadily over time? When did she fall behind? 
How has inequality evolved historically? Is today’s high inequality a permanent feature 
of modern Latin America? How have growth and inequality affected poverty reduction 
in the long run?. 
All these are pressing questions for economists, social scientists, and historians 
interested in Latin America. To provide a distinctive and definitive answer to each of 
them is beyond the individual effort. In this paper I will just present an overview of how 
much can be ascertained and what tentative answers can be given in the current state of 
research. From the growing literature on pro-poor growth some findings are especially 
relevant for my task. Poverty reduction depends both on growth of average incomes and 
on how income is distributed and the extent it does is closely linked to the sensitivity of 
poverty to both of them (the so called growth elasticity and inequality elasticity of 
poverty). We also know that the initial levels of development and inequality condition 
the impact on poverty of growth and improvements on income distribution. I will, 
hence, divide the exposition into three sections, dedicated to examine long-run trends in 
growth and inequality, and, on the basis of the first two sections’ findings and the 
empirical current research, to calibrate poverty reduction over the long run in modern 
Latin America. 
Long-run growth 
Unfortunately, research in quantitative economic history of Latin America has 
still a long way to go and we lack complete sets of homogenously constructed GDP 
estimates that would allow space and time international comparisons. Independent 
recent attempts to build GDP series for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay only 
mitigate the problem of assessing quantitatively the performance of Latin America over 
time1.  
This lack of hard empirical evidence has not prevented ambitious interpretations 
of Latin American long-run economic performance to spread. A view that stresses a 
long run relative decline since independence has been favored in the literature (see, for 
example, Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1994: 410)). It is also widely accepted that the origins 
                                                 
1 Cf. Cortés Conde (1994, 1997) and Della Paolera et al. (2003) for Argentina; GRECO (2000) for 
Colombia; Díaz et al. (1998) for Chile; and Bértola (1998) for Uruguay. See Appendix A for the GDP 
series used here. 
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of modern Latin American retardation are located in the nineteenth century (John 
Coatsworth, 1993, and Stephen Haber, 1997). Coatsworth (1998) underlines, in turn, 
that Latin America fell behind between 1700 and 1900, as the gap to the US remained 
unaltered over the twentieth century.  
When did Latin America fall behind has important repercussions for the ongoing 
debate in which ad hoc interpretations are provided for assumed periods of decline. For 
example, the relevance of the interpretation that puts the burden of the explanation in 
the colonial legacy is closely dependent on the fact that Latin American retardation had 
taken place in the early nineteenth century. If this is not the case, the strength of the 
argument weakens dramatically. In the following paragraphs a quantitative and 
comparative assessment of Latin America’s performance is carried out in an attempt to 
cast some light on the hot issue of when Latin America lagged behind.  
A word of caution is required, however, before the quantitative results are 
discussed. Dissatisfaction with international comparisons carried out on the basis of 
trading exchange rate-converted GDP per head has led way to purchasing power parity 
(PPP) adjusted GDP estimates. Unfortunately, the construction of PPP converters 
involves high costs in terms of time and resources. An indirect method to derive 
historical estimates of real income levels for a large sample of countries, popularized by 
Angus Maddison (1995, 2001, 2003), is the backward projection of the PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita for a recent (usually the latest) benchmark with volume indices derived 
from national accounts data. This short-cut has the presentation advantage of providing 
international growth rates identical, by construction, to those calculated from national 
accounts. A distant PPP benchmark introduces, nonetheless, distortions in inter-
temporal comparisons since its validity depends on how stable the basket of goods and 
services used to construct the original PPP converters remains over time. Long term 
growth alters the composition of output and consumption and, hence, relative prices, 
rendering international comparisons of per capita income based upon remote PPPs 
highly questionable (Prados de la Escosura, 2000).  
Unfortunately, in order to facilitate comparisons over space and time the dearth 
of data has forced me to link volume estimates computed at national relative prices to 
benchmark estimates for the year 1980 expressed in 1980 Geary-Khamis dollars 
available for most Latin American countries from the UN’s International Comparisons 
Project (ICP IV).  
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Why to provide new, though still defective GDP series for Latin America when 
both Maddison (1995, 2003) and Astorga et al. (1998, 2003a) have presented their own 
estimates? There two main reasons, the first one relates to the chosen benchmark, 1980 
represents a more sound choice than those for 1990 and 1970 preferred by Maddison 
and Astorga et al., respectively. Neither for 1990 nor 1970 a systematic construction of 
purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP) have been constructed. Latin America 
was excluded from the United Nations International Comparisons Project (ICP) Phase V 
that resulted in the construction of multilateral PPPs for 56 countries. Maddison (1995, 
2003) estimated GDP levels for Latin American countries in 1990, first by projecting 
1980 per capita GDP levels expressed in 1980 international dollars (that resulted from 
ICP’s most complete sample of LAC countries until the most recent one for 1996) with 
volume indices of product per head taken from each country’s national accounts. Then, 
he reflated the GDP levels for 1990 (expressed in 1980 Geary-Khamis dollars) with the 
U.S. implicit GDP deflator in order to obtain output levels in 1990 international dollars. 
As regards Astorga et al. (1998, 2004a, 2004b) 1970 benchmark, expressed in 
international dollars, originally published by CEPAL [the Spanish acronym of ECLA] 
(1978), were derived from nominal GDP levels provided by national accounts and PPP 
exchange rates obtained by projecting directly computed PPPs for 1960 with each Latin 
American country’s inflation differential with respect to the USA (CEPAL, 1978: 7-8). 
The 1960 benchmark provides bilateral PPPs (Fisher PPPs is Astorga et al. choice) 
directly computed by the Economic Commission for Latin America [ECLA] for 1960 
(Braithwaite, 1968; ECLA, 1968)2. Among the two directly computed benchmarks 
available (1960 and 1980) I chose the latter for this paper, as it provides multilateral 
PPPs and its country coverage includes most OECD members3. Alternatively, Geary-
Khamis PPPs derived by the UN’s International Comparisons Project [ICP] for 1996 
could have been used but the 1980 benchmark provides a less remote year for the time 
span considered and it is, hence, preferable4. The second reason why my estimates differ 
from the previous ones by Maddison and Astorga et al. is that I have widened the 
country coverage including the latest national GDP estimates available (Appendix A).  
                                                 
2 The commodity basket included 261 consumption goods and 113 investment goods for capital cities in  
nineteen Latin American countries and the US (Houston and Los Angeles). Prices were collected in 
1960/62. Quantity expenditure weights for a Latin American average and the US in 1960 were used 
(ECLA, 1968; Braithwaite, 1968).  
3 Nonetheless, I have replicated the whole exercise presented here at 1960 international prices with no 
major discrepancies in the results. In another paper (Prados de la Escosura, 2004b) I rely on the 1960 
benchmark expressed at US relative prices. 
4 Hofman (2000, 2001) also relies on 1980 international dollars for Latin America. 
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Graph 1 and Table 1 present population-weighted measures of real GDP per 
head in Latin America over one and a half centuries. Some main features of historical 
performance in Latin America can be pointed. In the first place, the origins of modern 
economic growth, as defined by a sustained increase in output per person, can be traced 
back to, at least, mid-nineteenth century, as a sustained improvement in GDP per capita 
is already observable since the 1860s. Latin America appears to have experienced a 
sustained and gradual growth over more than a century only broken during the 1890s, 
the Great Depression and, especially, the early 1980s crisis. In Table 1 growth rates are 
presented for different groups of Latin American countries, with the lengthier the 
coverage the lower the number of countries comprised. Fortunately, though, the picture 
they offer of Latin America’s performance seems quite robust. After a slow start in the 
mid-nineteenth century, Latin America appears to grow significantly during the 
eighteen seventies and eighties and, after the slow down of the 1890s, to accelerate up 
to World War I. A comparison with the group of advanced countries included under the 
label OECD shows that Latin America grew faster in the periods 1870-90 (LA6) and, 
especially, in the 1900-1913 (LA6 and LA10). Latin America’s output per head slowed 
down its pace because of World War I and reached a halt in the years of the Great 
Depression, but its comparative performance was not dissimilar from that of OECD 
countries. In sum, during the first phase of sustained growth in per capita income, 1870-
1929,  Latin America does not appear to have fallen behind, but to keep pace with the 
advanced country club but, like everybody else, grew slower than the U.S. After the 
Depression, Latin America enjoyed its fastest phase of growth that lasted more than 
four decades, at a pace closer to that of  OECD, in which its better performance in the 
1970s made somehow for a slower growth in the so called ‘Golden Age’ (1950-73). The 
1980s represent a major break in the long-run performance of Latin America that fell 
short of being offset by the sluggish growth of the 1990s. Thus, while the growth of the 
early phase, 1860s-1929, was superseded by the performance of the 1930s-1980, the 
post-1980 era offers a phase of slowing down. 
The comparison with Spain, a country that shares with Latin America culture 
and institutions, is illuminating. Spain exhibits a pace of growth similar to Latin 
America’s over 1870-1929 and after the 1930s crisis (magnified by the Civil War). 
Spain, however, grew faster in the 1950s and experienced super-growth in the 1960s 
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and early 1970s5. Moreover, in spite of the nearly stagnation in the decade of ‘transition 
to democracy’ (1975-85), Spain’s growth has been above OECD average during the last 
two decades of the twentieth century. 
If a neo-classical growth approach is chosen, a different view of Latin American 
performance results. As Latin America started from lower levels of GDP per head and, 
subsequently, poorer endowment of human and physical capital, a faster growth rate 
should, ceteris paribus, be expected. Hence, her performance would appear 
disappointing, especially in the second half of the twentieth century when, in an 
increasingly globalized world, access to the latest technological vintage depended upon 
a country’s social capability. The case of Spain and, more recently, of South East Asian 
nations support this interpretation. 
Decomposing per capita GDP growth using identity (I), provides a more 
accurate explanation of Latin American slow down. If low case represents annual rates 
of variation, per capita income growth results from adding the rates of variation of labor 
productivity (output per economically active population [EAP], of the activity rate 
(EAP per population ages 15 to 64, or potentially active population [PAP]), and that of 
the PAP in total population. 
ypc = y/eap + eap/pap + pap/population          (I) 
Labor productivity that, in the nineteen fifties and sixties, had overcome per 
capita GDP growth making  for a declining activity rate and for a higher dependency 
rate (population below 15 and above 65 over PAP), lagged behind since the 1970s 
(Table 1b). In the 1970s and, again, in the 1990s the increase in the activity rate, related 
to the reduction of unemployment and, especially in the nineties, to the incorporation of 
women to the labor force (Astorga et al., 2003: 35). Actually, with hardly any labor 
productivity growth, per capita income continued rising on the basis of an increase in 
the PAP/population ratio (as the demographic transition reached an end) plus the rise in 
the activity rate. A further decomposition of labor productivity into physical and human 
capital per worker and total factor productivity (TFP) is necessary to understand the 
slowing down of workers’ efficiency. Astorga et al. (2003: 34) suggest, after 1980, an 
average decline in TFP growth together with a fall in capital deepening for a six country 
sample (LA4 plus Argentina and Colombia). Hofman (2001) has a more benign view of 
                                                 
5 In Spain, the year 1938 represents a trough in economic performance. 
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TFP growth and points that the decline in labor productivity reflects a ‘strong increase’ 
in labor inputs6. 
So far, the focus of attention has been on Latin America as a whole but the 
region conceals a heterogeneous group of countries that exhibit substantial 
discrepancies in their factor endowments and long-run performance. The fact that most 
economic historians only address their research to a country or just to a one of its 
regions supports the case. Latin America as a whole is, however, what scholars see from 
the outside and, therefore, remains a valid concept once allowance is made for the wide 
dispersion in terms of performance and policies. Inequality between Latin American 
countries increase during the first époque of globalization (1870-1913) as countries 
reacted very differently depending on their exposition to international commodity and 
factor movements (Prados de la Escosura, 2004). De-globalization in the Interwar years 
witnessed a reduction in across-country inequality. Between the early forties and 1970, 
across-countries inequality rose and, then, collapsed to mid-nineteenth century levels. 
Such a process of convergence within Latin America is parallel to the divergence with 
respect to the advanced countries as will be discussed below. 
Per capita real GDP levels for major Latin American countries at roughly 
decadal benchmarks are presented since 1850 in Graph 2, depending on the availability 
of historical estimates. The high variance of growth rates of GDP per capita in Latin 
America (Table 2) is worth highlighting. Argentina, Chile and Mexico income per head 
grew above Latin America’s average between 1870 and 1913, while Brazil, Colombia, 
Peru, and Venezuela did it over 1913-1938. On the whole, during the early phase of 
modern economic growth (1870-1929) Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and, to lesser extent, 
Argentina grew above the region’s average. In the second phase of sustained expansion 
(1938-80), Mexico and especially Brazil emerge above the average, while Chile stands 
alone above it in the last two decades of the twentieth century.  As countries starting 
from lower income levels have grown faster than average over the long run, a pattern of 
convergence among Latin American nations has been building up over time. 
When we look at the components of per capita GDP growth, a systematic pattern 
emerges across countries (Table 3). Labor productivity growth fell behind GDP per 
head growth in the last two decades of the twentieth century, but was offset by the rise 
in the activity rate and by the demographic gift of an increasing share of potentially 
                                                 
6 Also Fajnzylber and Lederman (2000) and Hofman (2000) found a negative TFP growth in the 1980s. 
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active population. It is worth mentioning that the demographic gift takes place since 
1970, in common with U.N. labeled ‘less developed countries’ (Lee, 2003) and was not 
offset by a decline in the rate of activity resulting from higher unemployment (except 
for Brazil in the 1990s and Mexico in the 1980s). Per capita income growth has been 
sustained, in some cases, or has not fallen more sharply, in others, largely thanks to the 
demographic bonus. Finally the somehow inverse evolution between the rate of activity 
and labor productivity might suggest a falling capital-labor ratio due to fast growing 
employment. 
The comparison between Latin America and other regions or countries allow us 
to place Latin America’s achievements into an international perspective. But, which is 
the adequate yardstick to assess Latin America’s success or failure? Usually Latin 
America is examined in the U.S. mirror and usual interpretations of early failure and 
moderate success in the twentieth century derive that way. However, even western 
European economies fell behind relative to the U.S. over the nineteenth century, while 
the fact that Latin America’s relative position to the U.S. remained mostly unaltered 
during the twentieth century seems at odds with the catching up experience in large 
areas of the Periphery (Southern Europe, Southeast Asia), in which the gap with the 
U.S. was significantly reduced after 1950, whereas Latin America only grew faster that 
the US in the 1970s. The US represents, thus, a questionable yardstick. I propose 
instead to use a more comprehensive yardstick, the group of advanced countries from 
the Old and New World that are today part of the OECD, [hereafter, OECD for short]. 
This country sample also includes countries that belonged to the European Periphery 
but are part of the Core today, such as Italy, Ireland, or Spain. Actually, Spain has been 
singled out in the comparisons since she shares institutions with Latin America while 
she offers a different experience of economic development. 
Graph 3 presents the evolution of population-weighted averages of per capita 
incomes in Latin America relative to the OECD average7. The relative position of Latin 
America in terms of OECD GDP per head presents a wide inverted U-shape for all 
country samples, except for LA4. In the early phase of modern economic growth (1870-
1929) Latin America maintained a stable relative position around 50 percent. Later, in 
the phase of accelerating expansion, 1938-1980, Latin America experienced a paradox 
of growth and retardation, falling by almost 20 percent. Lastly, the faltering 
                                                 
7 The number of countries included in each sample figures after the region’s name, that is, LA6 means 
that six countries are included in this Latin American (LA) sample. 
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performance of the last two decades of the twentieth century took Latin America to half 
its relative position in 1929. When Latin America is compared with Spain, instead, 
(Graph 3b), together with a relative improvement during the central years of the 
twentieth century, resulting from Spain’s Civil War and autarkic aftermath, a sustained 
decline is noticeable during its last three decades. It appears, then, that during the period 
considered, that spans over two phases of globalization and one of de-globalization, 
Latin America does not seem to have fallen behind until the late twentieth century. Such 
a finding is in stark contradiction with conventional assessments that locate Latin 
American retardation in the nineteenth century.  
Table 4 decomposes Latin America’s position relative to OECD and to Spain in 
terms of GDP per head’s components, while Table 5 replicates the exercise for major 
individual countries. Lack of country coverage prevent us from extending the exercise 
for Latin America as a whole before 1950 (Panel A), so a reduced exercise 
decomposing GDP per head into GDP per potentially active population and the share of 
population ages 15 to 64 is provided (Panel B). It can be noticed that labor productivity 
systematically reaches higher relative levels than GDP per head as a consequence of a 
lower population in working age, and, when the comparison is carried out with OECD, 
also of a lower activity rate (a feature related to a lower female participation in the labor 
force).  
High dependency rates in Latin America (Graph 5), resulting from a delayed 
demographic transition help explain lower levels of GDP per person and, hence, higher 
poverty in Latin America. The persistence of high dependency rates in Latin America 
hint to the lack of incentives to reduce fertility provided by the institutional framework 
and to the weak demand of human capital that helped to bring about the demographic 
transition in OECD countries (Galor, 2004), and deserves more careful research. 
To sum up, modern Latin America experienced sustained growth since mid 
nineteenth century only brought to a halt during the 1980s. Paradoxically, as in other 
cases within the Periphery, growth was accompanied by backwardness relative to 
advanced countries, in particular, during the second half of the twentieth century, and 
more especially since 1980. What are the implications of such findings for the ongoing 
debate on Latin America’s retardation? Contrary to a widely held view, Latin America’s 
retardation, vis-à-vis OECD countries, appears to be a late twentieth century 
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phenomenon8. Moreover, the decline that probably took place in the decades after 
independence seems hardly comparable to the dramatic fall in Latin America’s position 
relative to the OECD in the late twentieth century. It seems plausible that in the half 
century after independence Latin America grew at a slower pace than during the early 
phase of globalization (1870-1913) but it can be claimed that retardation took place in 
only when Latin America is compared to a small group of western countries. Thus, the 
empirical findings presented here seriously challenge conventional assessments that 
locate Latin American retardation in the nineteenth century and link it to geography, 
initial inequality of wealth and power, colonial heritage, and post-independence political 
instability and turmoil. They all certainly hindered long-run growth and a counterfactual 
scenario with law and order, lower inequality, and British institutions would have cast a 
higher growth rate in Latin America. However, this is not the issue at stake here. Latin 
America fell behind dramatically in the late twentieth century and, particularly, since 
1980. Such a result demands an explanation. Was it because of inward-looking and 
interventionist policies? Was it because of poorly defined and enforced property rights? 
Astorga et al. (2003) claimed that it is misleading to associate import-industrialization 
strategies to faltering performance as it was during the decades in which such policies 
were implemented (1937-77) that growth intensified and welfare levels improved; 
conversely the neo-liberal policies, including privatizations, correspond to the post-1978 
phase of economic stagnation and relative decline. Astorga et al. (2003) views remind 
us that simplistic explanations of Latin American backwardness, written with the 
exclusive help of theory, are doomed to failure and set the agenda for further research. I 
will not attempt here, therefore, an easy answer but would like to recall that the period 
of fastest growth in Latin America, that from World War II till 1980, is also the one in 
which Latin America fell behind OECD countries, a fate not shared by other regions of 
the Periphery, such as south-western Europe and East Asia, which were catching up to 
the Core. Moreover, in the post-1980 era, neo-liberal policies were not always 
accompanied by deep institutional reforms that would have drastically changed the set 
of incentives received by economic agents (Taylor, 1998). Government credibility and 
institutional quality and stability would have help to promote growth. Trade volatility 
(both in volumes and relative prices) and interest rate shocks, it has been argued, were also 
major impediments to sustained economic growth and catching up (Astorga et al., 2005). 
                                                 
8 Of course, only the post-1850 era is analyzed here but similar results appear when the scope is widened 
both in time and regional coverage. Cf. Prados de la Escosura (2004b). 
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 Long-run Inequality 
Latin America is today the world region in which inequality is highest, with an 
average Gini coefficient above 50 during the last four decades of the twentieth century 
(Deininger and Squire, 1996, 1998). A stable income distribution since the post-war 
period has worsened after 1980 (Altimir, 1987; Morley, 2000). Furthermore, no 
significant improvement in the relationship between income distribution and economic 
growth has taken place during the last decade (Londoño and Székely, 1997) and 
inequality remained high despite episodes of sustained growth (ECLAC, 2000).   
Does such an assessment apply to modern Latin American history? 
Unfortunately, no quantitative assessment of long-run inequality has been carried out 
for Latin America, but the perception of unrelenting inequality deeply rooted in the past, 
is widespread among social scientists and historians. A good example is provided by 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) investigation of the historical trends in world 
income inequality. Lack of empirical evidence and conventional wisdom led them to 
assume that no changes in income distribution had taken place in Latin America from 
independence to the mid-twentieth century. Only the path-breaking work by Bértola and 
his associates (2005) for Uruguay has recently provided crude estimates of income 
distribution and Gini coefficients that go back to the late nineteenth century.  
How has the persistence of inequality been explained? Different alternative 
interpretations have been put forward. Among them, those that emphasize its colonial 
roots are worth stressing. According to Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), initial inequality 
of wealth, human capital and political power conditioned institutional design and, 
hence, performance in Spanish America. Large scale estates, built on pre-conquest 
social organization and extensive supply of native labor, established the initial levels of 
inequality. In the post-independence world, elites designed institutions protecting their 
privileges. In such a path-dependent framework Government policies and institutions 
restricted competition and offered opportunities to select groups (Sokoloff and 
Engerman, 2000).  
Moreover, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) maintain a different 
explanation for the uneven fate of former colonies. Where abundant population showed 
relative affluence, ‘extractive institutions’ were established, under which most of the 
population risks expropriation at the hands of the ruling elite or the government (forced 
labor and tributes, often existing already in the pre-colonial era, over the locals) with 
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political power concentrated in the hands of an elite, represented the most efficient 
choice for European colonizers, despite its negative effects on long-term growth. This 
would be the case of the Iberian empires in the Americas, especially in its economic 
centers of Peru and New Spain. 
After independence, the opening up to the international economy has been 
associated to a widening of income differences within and across countries. The 
opening to the international economy was seen by Dependentists as a cause of 
increasing inequality across and within countries, stressing the role of the terms of trade 
in Latin American retardation as either they improved and shifted resources to primary 
production (Hans Singer, 1950), or deteriorated and provoked immiserizing growth 
(Raúl Prebisch, 1950). Neoclassical trade theory predicts, in turn, that trade liberalization 
after independence would allow Latin American countries to specialize along the lines of 
comparative advantage. The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts natural resources, as the 
abundant factor, to be intensively used and, as a result, an increase of its relative price in 
terms of labor. This implies, in the Stolper-Samuelson extension of Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, that in so far land, the abundant factor, is more unequally distributed than labor, 
inequality would rise within national borders.  
No evidence is available on the former for the pre-1870 period with the 
exception of Argentina, for which Newland and Ortiz (2001) show that the expansion in 
the pastoral sector resulting from improved terms of trade increased the reward of 
capital and land, the most intensively used factors, while the farming sector contracted 
and the returns of its intensive factor, labor, declined, as confirmed by the drop in 
nominal wages. A redistribution of income in favor of owners of capital and land 
(estancieros) at the expense of workers took place in Argentina between 1820 and 1870. 
Williamson (1999), in turn, has explored the consequences for inequality of the early 
phase of globalization (1870-1914). On the basis of the wage-land rental ratio he 
showed an increase of inequality within-countries in Argentina and Uruguay which 
confirm empirically Stolper-Samuelson theoretical predictions. As natural resources 
were the abundant productive factor in Latin America, they were more intensively used 
in the production of exportable commodities. As a result, returns to land grew relatively 
to those of labor. Since the ownership of natural resources is more concentrated than 
that of labor, income distribution tended to be skewed towards landowners and 
inequality rose over the decades prior to World War I. Presumably, inequality trends 
reversed in the Interwar when globalization was interrupted as suggested by the steep 
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decline in the wage-rental ratio stopped in Argentina and Uruguay and its rise in the 
1930s (Bértola and Williamson, 2004). Globalization after 1980 has also been 
associated to rising inequality in Latin America. 
Arthur Lewis (1954) labor surplus model, in which the worker fails to share in 
GDP per capita growth since elastic labor supplies (migration of surplus labor from 
Southern Europe, especially Spain and Italy) keep wages and living standards stable, 
also provides the basis of an interpretation of rising inequality in Argentina (Díaz-
Alejandro, 1970) and Brazil (Leff, 1982) during the early phase of globalization.  
But, can we quantify trends in income inequality in modern Latin America? 
Lack of historical household surveys prevents so far to carry out studies along the lines 
sponsored by international institutions for the present. Only after a careful and 
painstaking research country by country, similar to that carried out by Bértola and his 
collaborators, Gini coefficients and other inequality measures will be available for Latin 
America’s past. Evidence is, however, available to conduct a series of quantitative 
exercises that can eventually convey an idea of how inequality has evolved within Latin 
American societies.  
An approach to assessing inequality has been proposed and applied to a wide 
international sample over 1870-1940 by Jeffrey Williamson (2002): the GDP per 
worker-unskilled wage ratio. The rationale for this choice is that such a ratio confronts 
the returns to unskilled labor with the returns to all production factors, that is, GDP.  
Since unskilled labor is the more evenly distributed factor of production in developing 
countries, an increase in the ratio suggests that inequality is rising. I have used 
Williamson’s real wages (1995, updated in 1996, and 2002) for Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay, and, when necessary extended the series up to 
1960 (Colombia (GRECO, 2002), Cuba (Zanetti and García, 1972), and Mexico 
(INEGI, 1995), together with Braun et al. (1998) real wage series for Chile. With real 
GDP per worker series I computed the GDP per worker-real wage ratio, expressed with 
1913=1. In order to smooth the results and present long-run trends I obtained eleven-
year centered moving averages for the inequality index. In Graph 6 the results for the 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay are presented. A sustained rise in the 
inequality index from the late nineteenth century up to World War I is observed for the 
Southern Cone (no data available for Colombia) during the early phase of globalization. 
Conversely, a decline in inequality took place the Interwar years, as globalization was 
reversed. This view confirms the Stolper-Samuelson interpretation. It should be 
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observed that inequality appears to be positively correlated with economic growth in the 
Southern Cone, as suggested by the correspondence between rising inequality and per 
capita income up to 1913 and the Interwar decline in both indicators (Table 2). The 
stabilization or decline of inequality during the mid-twentieth century could be related, 
as Bértola (2005) points, to urbanization and the emerging role of Government. 
Redistributive policies, as suggest by the rise of income tax share of Government 
revenues in the thirties and forties (Astorga and Fitzgerald, 1998: 346) are correlated 
with the decline in the inequality index in Argentina and Chile and its stagnation in 
Uruguay. The sustained rise in inequality exhibited between the late thirties and fifties 
in Colombia demands an explanation.  
In Graph 6b trends in inequality are offered for Brazil and Mexico, countries less 
exposed to international competition that those of the Southern Cone, and Cuba. Brazil 
presents a long-run decline up to 1913, with a flat phase between the late 1860s and 
1890s, while Mexico shows a moderate increase in inequality between the 1880s and 
the Revolution of 1910, and scattered evidence for Cuba suggests a similar pattern. A 
dramatic increase in inequality took place in the three countries after 1910 and well into 
the 1920s, followed by stabilization over the 1930s in Brazil and Cuba. A gradual rise in 
inequality in Brazil contrasts with the inequality reduction in Cuba between the early 
1940s and the late 1950s. If the data on Cuba is taken at face value, the 1959 Revolution 
would have occurred in a context of inequality stability after a sustained fall in a context 
of stagnated per capita income. The case of Mexico provides some perplexities too. The 
aftermath of the 1910 Revolution would have been, according to the inequality index, of 
rising inequality. Then, after a phase of dramatic inequality reduction, a spectacular rise 
in the inequality would have taken place between the mid-thirties and the mid-fifties, a 
period of accelerating growth in per capita income due to improving labor productivity 
and employment creation (Table 3). Does it mean that, in some Latin American 
countries, there was a tradeoff between growth and inequality? 
But, how was the long-run evolution of inequality when the evidence for ‘pre-
statistical’ era is spliced with the data from the 1950s onwards? Table 6 and Graphs 7 
and 7b provide a heuristic exercise in which available Gini coefficients have been 
projected backwards with the ‘inequality ratios’ so a conjectural view of long-run 
inequality trends is obtained (Appendix B). Several features are worth highlighting. 
Inequality rose steadily until it reached a high plateau in which has stabilized over the 
last four decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, persistent high inequality seems to 
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be confirmed at least since the Great Depression. Another relevant feature seems to be 
the wide variance across Latin American countries in which Gini indices range from 40 
to almost 60. Nonetheless, countries’ positions in the inequality ranking are not fixed. 
Southern Cone nations (Argentina and Chile) exhibited the highest inequality levels 
until the Interwar years when inequality rose of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, countries 
that, by 1950, had already achieved the unenviable leading inequality positions of today. 
It is also worth noticing the inequality decline in Venezuela during the 1950s and the 
worsening of Chilean income distribution of the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, Uruguay 
appears to follow, at least until 1960, more European pattern of inequality. 
An attempt to provide a regional view is offered in Graph 7b (and at the bottom 
of Table 6)9. A growing inequality trend is noticeable with two phases of inequality 
expansion, one up to 1929 and, the second, from World War II up to 1960, while the 
1890s (associated to the Barings crisis) and the Great Depression years show a fall in 
inequality. The high plateau reached in the 1960s presents a high stability over the last 
four decades of the twentieth century that dwarfs the contraction in inequality of the 
seventies and its rise during the eighties. Finally, the contrast with the case of Spain 
might be illuminating. Spain and Latin America followed similar patterns until 1913, to 
depart from each other during the Interwar. The autarchy years (1939-58) reversed the 
trend and Spain converged to Latin America’s inequality level. Since the 1960s Spain 
has shifted away from the Latin America to come close to the western European pattern 
of inequality.  
Similar inequality trends up to World War I stem, however, from opposite 
policies in Spain and Latin America as their resource endowment and factor proportions 
are very different, and they can be interpreted in Stolper-Samuelson terms. While the 
abundant factor in Latin America is land, in Spain is labor. Thus, when Latin America 
opened up to international competition, as it happened from its colonial independence, 
and especially, since mid nineteenth century, up to World War I, the relative position of 
land improved and, as it was unevenly distributed, inequality tended ceteris paribus to 
increase. Conversely, isolation from commodity and factor markets in late nineteenth 
century Spain brought with it a rise in inequality as the scarce and unevenly distributed 
factors (land and capital) improved their position to labor. This framework helps explain 
                                                 
9 LatAm4 is used to differentiate it from LA4, and includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay; 
LatAm6 adds Colombia and Mexico. Mexico’s Gini estimates only starts in 1913 as the backward 
projection of Gini with the inequality index casts implausible figures. 
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that inequality increased again in Spain during the autarchy years (1939-58) and 
declined after the cautious opening up that took place since 1959. Meanwhile, in Latin 
America, a reduction in inequality could be predicted during the Interwar as its 
economy closed up and a new surge in inequality during the second wave of 
globalization (1950-80). Naturally, the impact on income distribution of international 
trade and factor mobility is not the only force at play. Redistributive forces from an 
increasing role of government and industrialization also appear to have had an effect on 
inequality reduction in Latin America during the twentieth century.  
 
Long-run trends in poverty 
Has the growth in average incomes contributed to poverty reduction despite the 
increase in inequality? The old trade-off between growth and poverty has been 
challenged (Krongkaew and Kakwani, 2003; Kraay, 2004). In this section no attempt is 
made to measure the extent to which poverty is reduced with any degree of accuracy but 
to offer some evidence about its evolution and, in a heuristic exercise, to calibrate 
possible trends of absolute poverty from which hypotheses for further research can be 
derived. 
Low farm productivity, low rural living standards relative to urban, and poor 
basic education have been pointed in the recent literature on pro-poor growth as 
elements that prevent the impact of growth on poverty reduction (Klasen, 2004). The 
vast majority of the poor usually live in rural areas and the factor of production they 
possess is almost exclusively labor. Improving labor productivity increases rural 
incomes and helps reducing inequality as well as promoting growth and, thus, may 
contribute to poverty reduction. Usually, rural-urban migration is accompanied by rising 
productivity in agriculture, although sometimes the latter is just a response to 
productivity gains in the urban sector. In any case, migration from the countryside raises 
the income of those left behind. As a whole, rural-urban migration tends to have a 
positive impact on poverty reduction.  
What the experience of Latin American countries in this regard? As the poor are 
unevenly distributed and more concentrated in rural areas, structural change and 
urbanization are also related to poverty reduction and will be, consequently, explored. A 
sustained decline in the share of agriculture in total employment, that fell below one-
fifth of total employment is noticeable in countries such as Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay, in the Southern Cone, and Cuba and Venezuela in the Caribbean during the 
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second phase of sustained growth (Table 7). Nonetheless, this trend cannot be 
generalized. Haiti, Guatemala and Bolivia kept half or more of its labor force in the 
primary sector, while several others, including Mexico and Peru still maintained more 
than one-third of workers in agriculture by 1990.  The labor productivity gap in 
agriculture tended to close (Table 8) but, again, the correspondence between those 
countries experiencing a long-run decline in agricultural employment and those in 
which the productivity gap exhibited a shrinking trend is weak, and only includes 
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela. Countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Cuba reduced 
the relative size of agricultural employment while keeping a substantial intersectoral 
productivity gap. Conversely, others, such as Colombia and Central America 
maintained high proportions of labor in agriculture while the average labor productivity 
gap was closing (actually, it did completely in Nicaragua). The reliance on cash crops in 
these countries helps explain why this was the case. The shift from countryside to cities 
is confirmed by an increasing urbanization (Table 9) that reached beyond four-fifths of 
the population in the Southern Cone, Brazil, and Venezuela, but remains below half the 
population in Central America and Haiti.  
How to make sense of these results. A possibility is to compute the rural-urban 
gap in terms of per capita income. I have followed a crude approach here and assumed 
that incomes in the countryside accrued mostly from agriculture. It is true that those 
living in rural area also provided for services and light industrial goods but the opposite 
could also be said of some of those living in cities (‘agro-cities’, as they continue 
supplying labor to agricultural tasks at peak season). In any case, if agricultural output 
is divided by population living in non-urban areas, a lower bound of rural incomes can 
be obtained. Its ratio to average incomes (per capita GDP) provides a crude indicator of 
the income gap between countryside and the city.  
Again, the results for the evolution of the rural-urban income gap are ambiguous 
and while in Argentina, Uruguay, and Nicaragua was even reversed while it closed 
dramatically in Colombia and Peru, it remained rather large in Mexico, Central 
America, and the Caribbean at the end of the twentieth century (around one-half that for 
Mexico fell to one-fourth) (Table 10). The overall assessment casts mixed results. The 
population residing in the countryside shrank throughout the twentieth century and in 
many instances the rural-urban gap was reduced. Yet, by 1990, a non negligible share of 
the population, especially in the northern section of Latin America remained in rural 
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areas living on a substantial lower income than those already in the city. High 
concentration of population in rural areas tends unequivocally to suggest poverty. 
In the growing body of literature on the so called ‘pro-poor growth’ there is no 
agreement about how intense income growth of the poor should be relative to average 
per capita GDP for this growth being labeled ‘pro-poor’. Measuring pro-poor growth is 
highly demanding in terms of empirical evidence, and data on income distribution, at 
least by quintile, is required.  
In this paper the focus is on absolute growth of the poor’s incomes (Ravaillon 
and Chen, 2003) rather than on whether a relatively disproportionate growth in the 
poor’s incomes took place (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). I will look, then, at the 
evolution of absolute poverty as defined by a fixed international poverty line. Given the 
fact that Latin America, although exhibiting persistently high inequality, is not among 
the poorest regions of the world, I have decided to use a poverty line (PL, hereafter] 
equivalent to 1985 Geary-Khamis $ 4 a day, instead of just $1 or $2. Adjusted by the 
US implicit GDP deflator, it represents in 1980 prices $ 3.1 a day (purchasing power 
adjusted), that is, $ 1,130 per person a year, or $ 4,521 per year for a four member 
family unit. On average, in Latin America, per capita income remained below the 
poverty line until World War I and did not double it until the 1960s (Table 11). If we 
have in mind the results from recent empirical research in developing countries (for 
example, Bourguignon, 2002; Klasen, 2004; López, 2004; Ravallion, 1997, 2004) such 
a low level of development probably hampered the impact of growth on poverty 
reduction (Deiniger and Squire, 1998). In the ongoing debate on pro-poor growth few 
views are shared. One of them is that the higher the initial level of inequality, the lower 
the reduction in poverty for a given rate of growth in GDP per head. Hence, the high 
levels of inequality presented above may have represented a deterrent for a deeper 
impact of growth on the poor. As Martin Ravallion (2004) has put it, ‘poverty responds 
slowly to growth in high inequality countries’ or, in other words,  ‘high inequality 
countries will need unusually high growth rates to achieve rapid poverty reduction’.  
There are no microeconomic data available on household expenditures to 
compute historical trends and levels of poverty in Latin America. In these 
circumstances, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) strategy of assuming that income 
distribution remained unaltered in Latin America from independence to the mid-
twentieth century is very appealing. In the case of absolute poverty, with a fixed poverty 
line and the proportion of population below that line for the present, it would suffice to 
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know the growth rate of GDP per head in order to compute levels of absolute poverty 
for the past. In fact, recent research findings point that a large proportion of long-run 
changes in poverty are accounted for by the growth in averages incomes (Kraay, 2004), 
and, therefore, emphasize the protection of property rights, stable macroeconomic 
policies, and openness to international trade as means of growth and poverty 
suppression (Klasen, 2004; OECD, 2004).  
Assuming a one-for-one reduction in poverty with per capita GDP growth seems 
a gross misrepresentation, and some economists have proposed to introduce a poverty 
elasticity of growth that would be lower the higher the initial level of inequality. In 
particular, Ravallion (2004) has proposed to associate poverty changes to economic 
growth using the following expression: 
Rate of poverty reduction = [Constant x (1-Inequality index)θ] x Ordinary 
growth rate 
In which the constant term is negative and the aversion coefficient θ is not less 
than one (θ = 3 is suggested).  
For the historical case of Latin America, I have carried out a calibration exercise 
of the impact on absolute poverty resulting from the trends described for GDP growth 
and inequality. To do so, I have drawn on Humberto López and Luis Servén (2005) 
recent empirical research that uses the largest microdata base so far for a wide sample of 
developing and developed countries over the last four decades. They follow a 
parametric approach and find that the observed distribution of income is consistent with 
the hypothesis of lognormality. Under lognormality, the contribution of growth and 
inequality to changes in poverty levels only depends on the average incomes ratio to the 
defined poverty line and the degree of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.  
 
Po = Φ (log (z /ν)/σ + σ/2), 
                
                                Where, σ= √2 Φ-1 ((1 + G)/2) 
 
Being  Po, the poverty headcount, that is, the share of population below the 
poverty line; Φ, a cumulative normal distribution; ν, average per capita income; z, the 
poverty line; σ, standard deviation of the distribution; and G, Gini coefficient. 
López and Servén (2005) findings confirm that poverty reduction depends on 
growth of average incomes and on how income is distributed, as well as on the growth 
and inequality elasticities of poverty. They stress how determinant the initial levels of 
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development and inequality are for the impact of growth and income distribution 
changes on poverty. 
Table 12 and Graphs 8 and 8b summarize the results of the conjectural exercise. 
A word of warning is necessary. The measurement error of the poverty levels is 
possibly high before the late twentieth century as they rely on Gini coefficients obtained 
as a backwards extrapolation of properly computed Gini indices with the inequality 
indices discussed above. Nonetheless, poverty trends are much better captured as the 
GDP per worker/unskilled wage ratio seems to grasp inequality tendencies rather well. 
Moreover, the other element to be taken into consideration, the GDP per head/Poverty 
Line ratio, is much more accurately estimated and, finally, the López and Servén (2005) 
model employed in the calibration is, as far I know, one of the more rigorous 
quantitative assessments of  the complex relationship between growth, inequality, and 
poverty. 
The main finding of the calibration exercise is, perhaps, that absolute poverty 
has experienced a long-run decline in Latin America since the late nineteenth century, 
only arrested in the 1890s and the 1930s, and reversed in the 1980s (Graph 8b). In fact, 
the same two phases observed for Latin America’s growth can be observed for the 
evolution of poverty. The first one, between 1870 and 1929, interrupted during the 
1890s (Baring crisis years) and accelerated in the years from World War I to the Great 
Depression, and a second, of steadily acceleration in poverty decline between World 
War II and 1980. Once again, the 1980s stand alone as an exceptional decade in which 
poverty increased across the board. As regards the absolute number of poor, it grew 
over time as population expended in response to high fertility rates and only in the 
1970s, the number of poor did actually fall, only to rise again in the 1980s. For a 18- 
country sample (all Latin America but Cuba and Haiti) the number of poor went from 
93.8 million in 1980 to 127.4 million in 1990, when an absolute poverty line of 1985 
Geary-Khamis $ 4 a day is defined. 
The high coincidence between phases of growth and poverty reduction makes 
sense as long-run inequality appears to rise up to the high plateau in which has 
relatively stabilized today. It could be argued, along Kakwani and Pernia (2000 or 2002) 
or Klasen (2004) lines that, as inequality seems to have remained relatively stable across 
Latin American countries in the second half of the twentieth century, economic growth 
resulted in proportional increases in the incomes of the poor, not in absolute terms (as 
Ravallion has reminded us) and, hence, pro-poor growth stricto sensu never occurred. 
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Here, however, I adopt a less strict yardstick for the measurement of poverty and a 
reduction in the share of population below the poverty line is taken as a reduction in 
absolute poverty. 
Could it be said, then, that long-run poverty reduction in Latin America was led 
exclusively by the growth in average incomes?. A glance at the figures in Tables 2, 6, 
and 12 indicates that, when we descend at country level, this regularity is not confirmed. 
True that growth is the only force behind poverty reduction during 1870-90 in 
Argentina and Chile, but this is not the case at the episode of substantial poverty 
contraction, 1913-29, in which the fall in inequality played a significant role while per 
capita GDP growth decelerated, as the national experiences of Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay confirm. Growth, however, was the single force behind it in Brazil and almost 
exclusively in the case of Colombia during the same period. A combination of 
inequality contraction and growth lies behind the fall in poverty levels in Argentina 
between the late thirties and the early fifties, in Venezuela in the fifties and Peru in the 
sixties. Public redistributive policies (progressive taxes, transfers and other government 
spending) seem to have mattered for poverty reduction (Astorga and Fitzgerald, 1998).  
Nonetheless, in the second half of the twentieth century, growth emerges as the 
main and almost exclusive element underlying the reduction in absolute poverty. 
Examples are provided by Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s. This fact explains, 
perhaps, that absolute poverty levels remain as high in 1990. Growth itself apparently 
did not suffice to cut down poverty as sharply as was the case in western Europe. High 
persistent inequality prevented that intense growth during the 1950-80 had a deeper 
impact on poverty as the cases of Brazil and Colombia exemplify with still one-third of 
their population below the poverty line. Despite sustained growth in the long-run 
absolute poverty remained high in Latin America at the end of the twentieth century 
(above one-fourth in 1980, and nearly one-third in 1990). Moreover, the variance across 
nations has widened (the unweighted coefficient of variation for a 15-country sample 
rose from 0.37 in 1950 to 1.08 in 1990). In 1980, for example, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Chile had a poverty headcount around one third of their population, while Venezuela 
and Uruguay were below two digits and Mexico and Argentina slightly above. A look at 
small countries reveals that, for instance, in Central America, absolute poverty affected 
-if Costa Rica is excluded- half its population in 1980, and reached two-thirds in 1990. 
Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) also exhibited spectacular poverty levels 
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in 1990. Actually, if Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Mexico are excluded, poverty 
headcount in Latin America reaches one half of its population.  
The case of Spain presents, in turn, analogies and differences with Latin 
America. Spain shadowed the evolution of Latin American poverty until the 1960s, 
when she initiated a fast convergence towards western European patterns (Graph 8b). 
The influence of growth seems to have prevailed over inequality changes both in Latin 
America and Spain. In Spain, this was the case in the 1920 and in the 1959-74 years. 
Nonetheless, during the ‘democratic transition’ (1976-85) inequality fell and in spite of 
faltering growth absolute poverty declined. A major difference is, however, that 
inequality levels in Spain, as measured by the Gini coefficient, have tended to remain in 
the lower bound of Latin America’s Gini and, therefore, the growth of per capita income 
had a higher payoff in terms of poverty suppression in Spain than in Latin America.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has addressed recurrent questions by social scientists and historians. 
How much did Latin America grow since independence and how did she perform 
relative to advanced nations? Is inequality a long-run curse? How these two forces 
interact and affect poverty? Unfortunately only tentative conclusions that just represent 
hypotheses for further research can be offered. Among them, the following can be 
highlighted. 
Modern economic growth, defined along Kuznetsian lines as a sustained 
increase in output per person, can be traced back to mid-nineteenth century from where 
Latin America has experienced a moderate but sustained growth. Two phases, 1870-
1929 and 1938-1980 can be distinguished. In the first one, Latin America kept pace 
with the advanced nations’ club, OECD in present day jargon, but during the second 
experienced the paradox of achieving her fastest growth while falling behind. The 
1980s, in turn, opened an unenviable situation of faltering growth and retardation that 
lasted until the end of the twentieth century. 
A long-run rise in inequality seems another stylized feature of modern Latin 
America that reached a stable plateau in the late twentieth century. Persistent high 
inequality is, thus, confirmed by historical evidence with Gini indices ranging from 40 
to almost 60.  
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The high variance of growth rates of GDP per capita and inequality in Latin 
America is also worth highlighting. Moreover, countries’ positions have not remained 
unaltered. 
Absolute poverty experienced a long-run decline in Latin America since the late 
nineteenth century, its evolution shadowing that of per capita income growth. Long-run 
poverty reduction in Latin America was led but not exclusively conditioned by the 
growth in average incomes, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. The 
contrast with the case of Spain is revealing of the fact that, with a lower degree of initial 
inequality, Latin America’s economic growth would have had a larger payoff in terms 
of poverty reduction. 
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Appendix A  
Sources for GDP per Capita and per Worker Volume Indices  
 
GDP volume or quantity indices and population for OECD countries come from the 
national sources stated in Prados de la Escosura (2004) and Maddison (2003). Data for 
twentieth century Latin American GDP volumes and total population and economically 
active population comes, unless stated below, from Astorga and Fitzgerald (1998),  
Astorga, Bergés, and FitzGerald (2004a) OxLAD database, and Mitchell (1993).  
 
Argentina, Della Paolera, Taylor, and Bózolli (2003), GDP, 1884-1990, spliced with 
Cortés Conde (1994) for 1875-84. I assumed the level for 1870 was identical to that of 
1875.  
Brazil, GDP, Goldsmith (1986), 1850-1980. 
Chile, Díaz, Lüders and Wagner (1998) and Braun, Braun, Briones, and Díaz (2000) 
(1998). 
Colombia, GRECO (2002), since 1906. I assumed the level for 1900 was identical to 
that of 1906.  
México, INEGI (1995), 1850-1990. GDP figures from 1845 to 1896, interpolated from 
the original benchmark estimates.  
Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
Uruguay, Bértola and Associates (1998), since 1870. 
Venezuela, Baptista (1997). 
Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), I 
obtained the level for 1913 by assuming a growth for 1913-20 identical to that of 1920-
1925, the latter taken from OxLAD. 
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Appendix B  
Sources for Gini Indices 
Direct estimates 
1990, Székely (2001), except Guatemala from Londoño and Székely (1997). 
1970-80,  Londoño and Székely (1997) for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica; 
Altimir estimates reproduced in Hofman (2001), for Argentina and Bolivia (1980); 
WIDER (2004), for the Dominican Republic (1980); Deininger and Squire (1996), for 
Bolivia (1970), Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala (1970), Honduras (1980), Paraguay 
(1980), and Uruguay. 
1938-60, Altimir (1998) estimates reproduced in Astorga and Fitzgerald (1998) and 
Hofman (2001), except for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru from 
Deininger and Squire (1996, updated). 
Gini backward projections  
Gini coefficients projected backwards with inequality indices constructed as the ratio 
between unskilled wage indices and GDP per worker with 1913=1. Data for unskilled 
wage indices comes from Williamson (1995, updated in 1996, and 2002) for Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay, extended to 1960 with the following 
series: for Colombia, GRECO (2002), Cuba (Zanetti and García, 1972), and Mexico 
(INEGI, 1995). Real wage series for Chile come from Braun et al. (1998). GDP per 
worker figures from Appendix A. 
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Table 1. Economic Growth in Latin America and OECD Countries (logarithmic annual rates %) 
 
LA20 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
     
  
  
          
     
     
LA15 LA10
 
LA6 LA4 OECD15 OECD19 OECD21 Spain USA 
1850-1870 0,2 1,5 0,5 2,2
1870-1890 1,7 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,6
1890-1900 0,4 0,5 1,5 1,5 0,9 1,8
1900-1913 2,3 2,2 1,8 1,6 1,7 1,0 1,9
1913-1929 1,2 1,2 1,0 0,9 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,7 1,6
1929-1938 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,0 0,3 0,3 -4,8 -0,5
1938-1950 2,1 2,1 2,3 2,6 3,2 2,6 2,5 1,8 4,7
1950-1960 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 3,0 2,7 3,2 3,2 3,6 1,7
1960-1970 2,9 2,9 3,0 3,2 3,2 3,4 4,1 4,1 7,4 2,9
1970-1980 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,4 3,7 2,4 2,6 2,6 3,7 2,1
1980-1990 -0,5 -0,5 -0,4 -0,5 -0,2 2,1 2,3 2,3 2,9 2,1
1990-2000 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,5 1,3 1,9 1,8 1,8 2,4 1,9
  
1870-1929 1,4 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,7
1938-1980 2,9 2,6 2,6 2,7 3,0 2,9 3,0 3,0 3,9 2,9
1980-2000 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,6 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,6 2,0
 
1870-1980 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,8 2,0
1870-2000 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,0 1,9 2,0
  
LA4 Population-weighted average of Brasil, Chile, México, Venezuela  
LA6 Population-weighted average of LA4 + Argentina y Uruguay  
LA10 Population-weighted average of LA6 + Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador y Perú  
LA15 Population-weighted average of LA10 + Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Panamá  
LA20 Population-weighted average of Latin American countries  
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Table 1b. Per Capita GDP Growth and its Components in Latin America 
 
 
        Per Capita GDP     GDP per Worker EAP/PAP           PAP/Population
1950-1960 2,3 2,8 -0,2 -0,3
1960-1970 2,9 3,6 -0,4 -0,2
1970-1980 3,3 2,2 0,6 0,5
1980-1990 -0,5 -1,0 0,0 0,5
1990-2000 1,3 0,1 0,6 0,6
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Table 2. Economic Growth in Main Latin American Countries (logarithmic annual rates %) 
 
Argentina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela
1850-1870 0,2 1,7 0,0 -1,2
1870-1890 3,3 0,2 2,0 2,0 0,4 2,6
1890-1900 -0,8 -0,9 1,2 1,5 0,8 -1,5
1900-1913 2,5 2,2 2,3 1,8 3,2 1,9 1,4 3,1 2,6
1913-1929 0,9 1,4 0,9 3,9 -0,7 0,4 3,6 0,9 6,8
1929-1938 -0,8 1,0 -0,8 1,4 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,5
1938-1950 1,7 1,6 1,3 1,5 0,1 3,5 1,2 1,5 4,3
1950-1960 1,1 3,7 1,5 1,6 0,3 2,3 2,9 0,6 3,4
1960-1970 3,9 3,1 1,9 2,2 -0,4 3,4 2,3 0,8 2,4
1970-1980 2,1 5,8 0,9 2,9 5,5 2,5 1,7 2,1 0,1
1980-1990 -2,4 -0,2 1,2 1,1 0,6 -0,1 -3,3 -0,2 -1,9
1990-2000 2,8 0,8 5,0 0,7 -7,1 1,7 2,3 2,1 -0,1
 
1870-1929 1,8 0,8 1,6 3,0 1,0 1,5 2,7 1,2 3,0
1938-1980 2,1 3,4 1,4 2,1 1,3 2,9 1,9 1,4 2,6
1980-2000 0,2 0,3 3,1 0,9 -3,3 0,8 -0,5 0,9 -1,0
 
1870-1980 0,0 1,8 1,3 2,3 1,1 1,9 2,0 1,1 2,7
1870-2000 0,0 1,6 1,6 2,0 0,2 1,8 1,5 1,1 2,1
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     Table 3. Per Capita GDP Growth and its Components 
 
        Per Capita 
GDP 
 GDP per 
Worker
EAP/PAP   PAP/Population
Argentina  
1870-1913 2,1 2,4 -0,5 0,2
1913-1938 0,3 0,6 -0,6 0,3
1938-1950 1,7 0,7 0,8 0,1
1950-1960 1,1 1,6 -0,3 -0,2
1960-1970 3,9 4,0 -0,1 0,0
1970-1980 2,1 2,3 0,1 -0,4
1980-1990 -2,4 -2,2 0,0 -0,2
1990-2000 2,8 2,0 0,4 0,3
Brazil  
1938-1950 1,6 1,4 0,4 -0,3
1950-1960 3,7 3,9 0,0 -0,2
1960-1970 3,1 2,8 0,2 0,2
1970-1980 5,8 4,8 0,7 0,3
1980-1990 -0,2 -1,4 0,4 0,8
1990-2000 0,8 0,3 -0,3 0,8
Chile  
1890-1913 1,8 2,0 -0,2 0,1
1913-1938 0,3 0,4 -0,2 0,0
1938-1950 1,3 1,5 -0,1 -0,1
1950-1960 1,5 2,6 -0,6 -0,5
1960-1970 1,9 2,9 -0,9 -0,1
1970-1980 0,9 -0,1 0,0 1,0
1980-1990 1,2 -0,2 1,0 0,4
1990-2000 5,0 3,9 1,0 0,1
Colombia  
1913-1938 3,0 3,1 0,1 -0,1
1938-1950 1,5 2,1 -0,5 -0,1
1950-1960 1,6 2,6 -0,4 -0,5
1960-1970 2,2 2,3 -0,1 0,0
1970-1980 2,9 1,8 0,1 1,0
1980-1990 1,1 0,1 0,6 0,5
1990-2000 0,7 -0,8 1,1 0,5
Mexico  
1890-1913 1,7 2,2 -0,5 -0,1
1913-1938 0,4 0,9 -0,5 0,0
1938-1950 3,5 2,9 0,8 -0,3
1950-1960 2,3 2,5 0,3 -0,5
1960-1970 3,4 5,4 -1,6 -0,5
1970-1980 2,5 0,4 1,4 0,7
1980-1990 -0,1 0,8 -1,6 0,7
1990-2000 1,7 -1,8 2,7 0,8
Venezuela  
1925-1938 3,9 3,0 0,9 0,0
1938-1950 4,3 4,0 0,6 -0,2
1950-1960 3,4 4,1 -0,1 -0,6
1960-1970 2,4 2,9 -0,5 0,0
1970-1980 0,1 -1,3 0,7 0,7
1980-1990 -1,9 -2,8 0,5 0,4
1990-2000 -0,1 -1,1 0,4 0,6
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Table 4. Decomposition of Latin America’s Relative Per Capita GDP 
  
Panel A. LA19 
    Per Capita 
GDP 
 GDP per 
Worker
EAP/PAP   PAP/population
OECD21 = 100  
1950 0,43 0,52 0,95 0,87
1960 0,40 0,50 0,92 0,86
1970 0,36 0,47 0,91 0,84
1975 0,38 0,49 0,92 0,85
1980 0,38 0,49 0,93 0,85
1990 0,29 0,37 0,90 0,88
  
Spain = 100   
1950 1,12 1,17 1,13 0,85
1960 1,00 1,10 1,07 0,84
1970 0,66 0,75 1,01 0,87
1975 0,60 0,67 1,01 0,88
1980 0,63 0,62 1,15 0,89
1990 0,45 0,47 1,07 0,89
2000 0,41 0,43 1,03 0,92
 
 
Panel B. LA6 
  
OECD21 = 100 
 
Spain = 100 
     
    Per Capita 
GDP 
GDP/PAP   PAP/population    Per Capita 
GDP
GDP/PAP   PAP/population
   
1913 0,51 0,56 0,90 0,83 0,90 0,92
1925 0,51 0,58 0,88 0,79 0,85 0,93
1929 0,50 0,56 0,88 0,75 0,81 0,93
1938 0,49 0,56 0,86 1,17 1,28 0,91
1950 0,47 0,54 0,88 1,24 1,45 0,86
1960 0,44 0,51 0,87 1,12 1,31 0,85
1970 0,41 0,47 0,85 0,75 0,85 0,88
1975 0,44 0,51 0,86 0,69 0,77 0,90
1980 0,44 0,51 0,85 0,73 0,81 0,90
1990 0,33 0,38 0,89 0,52 0,58 0,90
2000 0,32 0,48 0,51 0,94
LA19: All Latin American countries except Cuba. 
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Table 5. Relative GDP per Head and its Components in  
              Major Latin American Countries (OECD19 = 1) 
     
    Per Capita   
GDP 
   GDP per  
Worker 
EAP/PAP   PAP/Population
Argentina     
1870 0,66 0,59 1,37 0,88 
1880 0,63 0,68 1,18 0,84 
1890 0,97 0,89 1,39 0,79 
1900 0,78 0,84 0,98 0,94 
1913 0,86 0,99 0,91 0,95 
1929 0,81 1,06 0,88 0,95 
1938 0,74 0,91 0,85 0,95 
1950 0,67 0,70 0,95 1,00 
1960 0,54 0,60 0,90 1,01 
1970 0,54 0,59 0,91 1,00 
1980 0,51 0,62 0,89 0,93 
1990 0,32 0,42 0,86 0,90 
Brazil     
1938 0,29 0,38 0,93 0,84 
1950 0,26 0,33 0,94 0,85 
1960 0,28 0,35 0,93 0,85 
1970 0,25 0,31 0,96 0,86 
1980 0,35 0,41 1,00 0,86 
1990 0,27 0,30 1,01 0,91 
Chile     
1900 0,68 0,83 0,88 0,93 
1913 0,74 0,90 0,87 0,95 
1929 0,69 1,02 0,82 0,91 
1938 0,63 0,80 0,89 0,89 
1950 0,55 0,68 0,89 0,91 
1960 0,46 0,63 0,82 0,89 
1970 0,37 0,56 0,76 0,87 
1980 0,32 0,47 0,73 0,93 
1990 0,29 0,38 0,79 0,95 
Colombia     
1900 0,24 0,25 1,04 0,92 
1913 0,25 0,30 0,92 0,91 
1929 0,38 0,50 0,96 0,86 
1938 0,42 0,51 0,99 0,82 
1950 0,37 0,46 0,97 0,84 
1960 0,32 0,43 0,90 0,82 
1970 0,27 0,36 0,90 0,81 
1980 0,27 0,35 0,91 0,86 
1990 0,24 0,30 0,93 0,89 
2000 0,22    
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Table 5. Relative GDP per Head and its Components in  
              Major Latin American Countries (OECD19 = 1) 
     
    Per Capita   
GDP 
   GDP per  
Worker 
EAP/PAP   PAP/Population
 
Mexico     
1890 0,72 0,82 0,86 1,02 
1900 0,64 0,78 0,90 0,92 
1913 0,64 0,86 0,82 0,91 
1929 0,57 0,93 0,76 0,89 
1938 0,58 0,88 0,78 0,85 
1950 0,65 0,89 0,87 0,84 
1960 0,60 0,83 0,88 0,83 
1970 0,56 0,95 0,76 0,78 
1980 0,56 0,81 0,85 0,81 
1990 0,44 0,74 0,70 0,85 
Peru     
1938 0,38 0,45 1,05 0,80 
1950 0,33 0,42 0,94 0,82 
1960 0,32 0,43 0,88 0,84 
1970 0,27 0,38 0,85 0,82 
1980 0,25 0,36 0,84 0,81 
1990 0,14 0,20 0,81 0,86 
Uruguay     
1950 0,93 0,98 0,98 0,96 
1960 0,72 0,77 0,93 1,01 
1970 0,52 0,57 0,92 1,00 
1980 0,50 0,58 0,91 0,95 
1990 0,39 0,43 0,97 0,93 
Venezuela     
1929 0,63 1,02 0,76 0,88 
1938 0,64 0,90 0,83 0,85 
1950 0,80 1,04 0,90 0,85 
1960 0,82 1,13 0,88 0,82 
1970 0,70 1,01 0,85 0,81 
1980 0,55 0,73 0,88 0,85 
1990 0,36 0,47 0,89 0,86 
 
 38
Table 6.   Income Distribution in Latin America: Gini Coefficients 
 
 1850              
              
               
              
              
              
              
              
             
             
              
            
              
              
             
              
              
              
              
              
     
           
              
              
              
            
            
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
 
Argentina 39,1 39,7 43,6 42,0 61,8 49,3 50,0 39,6 41,4 41,2 47,2 47,7
Bolivia 53,0 53,4 54,5
Brazil 46,2 37,2 32,9 33,0 34,4 29,8 29,5 47,2 46,4 55,4 57,0 57,1 57,1 57,3
Chile 36,6 40,7 41,3 47,2 51,9 58,5 65,5 49,2 40,5 41,7 48,2 47,4 53,1 54,7
Colombia 46,8 40,2 45,0 51,0 54,0 57,3 48,8 56,7
Costa Rica 30,7 50,0 44,5 48,5 46,0
Dominican R. 32,4 34,6 45,5 42,1 48,1
Ecuador 57,1 61,0 60,1 54,2 56,0 
El Salvador 44,0 42,4 46,5 48,4 50,5
Guatemala 42,3 28,6 30,0 49,7 59,9
Honduras 57,1 66,0 61,8 54,9 57,0
Mexico 27,8 24,3 30,4 55,0 60,6 57,9 50,9 53,1
Nicaragua 68,1 63,2 57,9 56,7 
Panama 56,4 50,0 58,4 47,5 56,3
Paraguay 45,1 57,0
Peru 39,2 61,0 48,5 43,0 46,4
Uruguay 29,6 33,1 32,2 38,4 45,9 36,6 34,9 37,9 37,0 42,8 43,6 40,6
Venezuela 61,3 46,2 48,0 44,7 44,0
 
LatAm4 34,8 35,9 38,0 35,4 40,5 47,5 46,4 50,4 52,7 53,1 54,9 55,2 
LatAm6 37,7 41,6 42,8 51,5 54,7 54,8 53,2 54,8
LatAm15 50,6 53,9 53,5 51,9 53,7
LatAm16 54,0 53,6 52,0 53,8
  
Spain 24.9 28.0 30.2 41.7 40.7 44.0 47.8 39.0 35.1 53.6 44.6 45,7 36,3 34,7 
 
Note: Direct estimates, in bold; Otherwise, backwards projection of Gini with Inequality Indices 
 39
Table 7.  Share of Economically Active Population in Agriculture 
 
1900         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 0,39 0,35 0,36 0,35 0,25 0,21 0,16 0,13 0,12
Bolivia 0,56 0,55 0,55 0,53 0,47
Brazil 0,71 0,69 0,62 0,55 0,47 0,37 0,23
Chile 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,36 0,33 0,30 0,24 0,21 0,19
Colombia 0,73 0,59 0,52 0,45 0,40 0,27
Costa Rica 0,57 0,51 0,43 0,35 0,26
Cuba 0,41 0,36 0,30 0,24 0,18
Dominican Republic 0,73 0,64 0,48 0,32 0,25
Ecuador 0,65 0,59 0,52 0,40 0,33
El Salvador 0,65 0,62 0,57 0,44 0,36
Guatemala 0,69 0,66 0,61 0,54 0,52
Haiti 0,86 0,80 0,74 0,71 0,68
Honduras 0,75 0,72 0,67 0,57 0,41
Mexico 0,62 0,68 0,70 0,66 0,66 0,54 0,50 0,36 0,35
Nicaragua 0,70 0,63 0,51 0,40 0,29
Panama 0,56 0,51 0,42 0,29 0,26
Paraguay 0,54 0,54 0,50 0,45 0,39
Peru 0,58 0,52 0,48 0,40 0,36
Uruguay 0,24 0,21 0,19 0,17 0,14
Venezuela 0,59 0,54 0,43 0,33 0,26 0,15 0,12
 
Sources: OxLAD (2004). 
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 Table 8.  Relative Labor Productivity in Agriculture 
 
1900         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 0,74 0,70 0,64 0,62 0,68 0,77 0,82 0,85 1,20
Bolivia 0,46 0,44 0,31 0,28 0,32
Brazil 0,32 0,33 0,27 0,24 0,21 0,20 0,34
Chile  0,44 0,42 0,32 0,40 0,34 0,32 0,33 0,35 0,43
Colombia 0,64 0,64 0,63 0,63 0,62 0,91
Costa Rica 0,67 0,58 0,59 0,58 0,84
Cuba 0,51 0,52 0,64 0,52 0,51
Dominican Republic 0,47 0,53 0,54 0,57 0,64
Ecuador 0,64 0,66 0,58 0,53 0,78
El Salvador 0,63 0,58 0,54 0,77 0,86
Guatemala 0,53 0,51 0,49 0,50 0,51
Haiti 0,61 0,62 0,68 0,56 0,58
Honduras 0,60 0,45 0,51 0,53 0,75
Mexico 0,45 0,37 0,28 0,30 0,28 0,30 0,23 0,24 0,22
Nicaragua 0,52 0,47 0,53 0,75 1,09
Panama 0,58 0,51 0,38 0,48 0,59
Paraguay 0,75 0,73 0,69 0,64 0,80
Peru 0,40 0,47 0,39 0,36 0,57
Uruguay 0,56 0,52 0,68 0,64 0,78
Venezuela 0,40 0,22 0,24 0,29 0,49 0,68
 
Sources: computed from OxLAD (2004). 
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Table 9.  Urbanization Rates in Latin America 
 
1850           
 
        
           
           
          
          
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
          
           
1870 1890 1913 1929 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
  
 Argentina 0,15 0,16 0,30 0,37 0,49 0,64 0,74 0,78 0,83 0,86 0,89 
Bolivia 0,22 0,34 0,39 0,41 0,46 0,56 0,65
Brazil 0,15 0,21 0,28 0,36 0,45 0,56 0,66 0,75 0,81
Chile* 0,08 0,15 0,21 0,33 0,43 0,57 0,68 0,75 0,81 0,83 0,85
Colombia 0,11 0,12 0,24 0,35 0,48 0,57 0,64 0,70 0,75
Costa Rica 0,24 0,15 0,20 0,34 0,37 0,40 0,43 0,46 0,52
Cuba 0,18 0,28 0,34 0,33 0,39 0,54 0,55 0,60 0,68 0,74 0,75
Dominican R. 0,11 0,14 0,24 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,58 0,65
Ecuador 0,10 0,20 0,25 0,23 0,29 0,34 0,39 0,47 0,55 0,62
El Salvador 0,26 0,45 0,37 0,38 0,39 0,42 0,44 0,47
Guatemala 0,30 0,25 0,25 0,32 0,36 0,37 0,38 0,40
Haiti 0,12 0,16 0,20 0,24 0,30 0,36
Honduras 0,18 0,24 0,31 0,23 0,29 0,35 0,42 0,47
Mexico 0,16 0,19 0,27 0,43 0,51 0,59 0,66 0,73 0,74
Nicaragua 0,20 0,18 0,23 0,24 0,35 0,40 0,47 0,50 0,53 0,65
Panama 0,14 0,25 0,36 0,41 0,48 0,50 0,54 0,58
Paraguay 0,20 0,37 0,24 0,35 0,36 0,37 0,42 0,49 0,56
Peru 0,12 0,25 0,42 0,46 0,57 0,65 0,69 0,73
Uruguay 0,16 0,29 0,44 0,44 0,49 0,63 0,80 0,82 0,85 0,89 0,91
Venezuela 0,11 0,13 0,27 0,43 0,61 0,72 0,79 0,84 0,87
 
Sources: OxLAD (2004), moved backwards with Flora (1981?), except for Chile since 1870 for which Cariola and Sunkel (1982: 144) were used 
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Table 10.   Relative Rural Income per Head   (GDP per Capita = 1) 
1900         
        
         
         
         
           
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
1913 1929 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
 
Argentina 0,41 0,39 0,45 0,48 0,60 0,61 0,65 1,08 1,08
Bolivia 0,39 0,40 0,29 0,27 0,34 0,39
Brazil 0,29 0,32 0,26 0,24 0,23 0,21 0,31 0,47
Chile 0,21 0,23 0,21 0,26 0,30 0,32 0,39 0,48 0,40
Colombia 0,60 0,60 0,65 0,58 0,63 0,67 0,70 0,79 0,84
Costa Rica 0,25 0,58 0,47 0,42 0,36 0,40 0,25
Cuba 0,45 0,41 0,48 0,38 0,35 0,31
Dominican R. 0,45 0,48 0,43 0,37 0,38 0,39
Ecuador 0,59 0,60 0,49 0,40 0,58 0,66
El Salvador 0,79 0,65 0,58 0,51 0,57 0,56 0,42
Guatemala 0,48 0,49 0,49 0,47 0,43 0,44 0,41
Haiti 0,60 0,58 0,63 0,52 0,56 0,57
Honduras 0,74 0,65 0,42 0,49 0,47 0,53 0,52
Mexico 0,33 0,25 0,27 0,32 0,33 0,29 0,25 0,28 0,26
Nicaragua 0,87 0,56 0,49 0,51 0,60 0,67 1,05
Panama 0,51 0,44 0,30 0,28 0,33 0,29
Paraguay 0,62 0,61 0,54 0,49 0,61 0,70
Peru 0,39 0,45 0,44 0,41 0,66 0,85
Uruguay 0,36 0,55 0,71 0,71 0,99 1,15
Venezuela 0,16 0,20 0,26 0,35 0,51 0,59
 
Sources:  See the text. 
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Table 11.   Average Income/Poverty Line Ratio in Latin America (Poverty Line: 1985 G-K $ 4 a day) 
 1850     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 0,7 0,8 1,3 1,2 1,7 1,9 1,8 2,2 2,5 3,6 4,5 3,5
Bolivia 0,8 0,6 0,9 1,1 1,0
Brazil 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,9 1,3 1,7 3,0 3,0
Chile 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,9 0,9 1,1 1,4 1,7 1,5 1,8 2,1 2,5 2,8 3,1
Colombia 0,4 0,5 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,8 2,4 2,7
Costa Rica 0,9 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,4 1,9 2,6 2,6
Dominican R. 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,6 1,4
Ecuador 0,4 0,5 0,7 0,7 1,1 1,3 1,5 2,3 2,2
El Salvador 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,3 1,1
Guatemala 0,7 0,8 1,1 1,0 1,1 1,4 1,8 1,6
Haiti 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,4
Honduras 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,0
Mexico 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,6 1,0 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,4 2,1 2,7 3,8 4,9 4,8
Nicaragua 0,8 1,4 0,8 1,3 1,6 2,5 1,7 1,0
Panama 1,1 1,3 2,0 2,5 2,3
Paraguay 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,0 1,6 1,7
Peru 0,4 0,5 0,9 0,9 1,1 1,4 1,8 2,1 1,5
Uruguay 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,5 2,2 2,5 2,6 3,1 3,3 3,5 4,3 4,3
Venezuela 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,5 1,5 1,6 2,6 3,7 4,7 4,7 3,9
 
LA4 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,4 1,9 2,6 3,7 3,7
LA6 0,5 0,6 0,8 0,7 1,0 1,2 1,2 1,6 2,0 2,7 3,8 3,7
LA10 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,2 1,5 1,9 2,5 3,5 3,4
LA14 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,5 1,8 2,5 3,4 3,3
LA19 1,4 1,8 2,4 3,3 3,1
 
Spain 0,6 0,7 0,7 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,2 1,6 1,0 1,3 1,8 3,6 5,3 7,0
 
OECD15 0,8 1,0 1,1 1,4 1,5 1,8 2,2 2,7 2,7 3,9 5,1 7,2 9,1 11,2
OECD19 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,9 2,4 2,4 3,3 4,5 6,8 8,7 10,9
OECD21 2,4 2,4 3,3 4,5 6,7 8,6 10,9
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 Table 12.   Poverty Headcount in Latin America (1985 G-K $ 4 a day): A Calibration  (%) 
 
 1850              
              
            65 71 
              
              
              
              
             
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
            44 54 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
     
           
1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Argentina 64 60 53 56 58 41 45 24 22 10 11 17
Bolivia 
Brazil 93 96 96 96 95 98 93 82 79 75 64 53 33 34
Chile 94 89 84 74 71 70 65 47 42 36 36 28 31 29
Colombia 90 70 65 61 57 52 32 37
Costa Rica 54 55 35 28 25
Dominican R. 83 71 64 43 53
Ecuador 87 84 79 66 43
El Salvador 74 66 58 58 64
Guatemala 63 52 37 44 59
Honduras 80 80 76 70 71
Mexico 43 31 36 43 41 27 13 15
Nicaragua 64 47 53 70
Panama 69 58 48 28 42
Paraguay 
Peru 60 62 43 29 48
Uruguay 45 48 42 43 32 15 12 11 8 12 8 6
Venezuela 43 14 11 8 11
 
LatAm4 89 85 84 85 81 67 66 59 52 43 29 30
LatAm6 71 59 60 55 50 40 25 27
LatAm15 57 51 41 27 30
LatAm16 51 41 27 30
 
Spain 88 81 81 67 67 64 60 39 62 62 39 14 2 0
  
Sources: See text. 
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Graph 1. GDP per head in Latin America (1980 G-K $)
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Graph 2. Trends in GDP per Head: 8 Major Latin American Countries (1980 G-K $)
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Graph 3. Relative GDP per Head in Latin America (OECD = 1)
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Graph 3b. Relative GDP per Head in Latin America (Spain = 1)
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 Graph 4. Relative GDP per Head in 8 Major Latin American Countries (OECD15 = 1)
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Graph 4b. Relative GDP per Head in 8 Major Latin American Countries (Spain = 1)
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 Graph 5. Dependency Rates in Latin America, OECD, and Spain
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Graph 6. Inequality Trends in Four Latin American Countries
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 Graph 6b. Inequality Index in Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico
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 Graph 7. Gini Estimates for Major  Latin American Countries
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Graph 7b. Gini Estimates for Latin America and Spain
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1913 1929 1938 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
LatAm4 LatAm6 LatAm15 LatAm16 Spain
 Graph 8. Poverty Headcount in 7 Latin American Countries
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Graph 8b. Poverty Headcount in Latin America and Spain  (Poverty Line: 1980 G-K $ 4 a day)
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